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Philosophy sometimes has the reputation of dealing with matters outside the realm of 
‘everyday life’, and trading in ideas that float free from anything beyond the armchair 
in which we sit contemplating them. I want to talk about a standard armchair-branch 
of philosophy – personal identity theory – and the real-life effects it either has had or 
has apparently failed to have upon two philosophers. The two philosophers are David 
Hume and Derek Parfit. Both arrive at similar and quite radical beliefs about personal 
identity. And both have documented the difficulty of sustaining these beliefs in their 
day-to-day lives. For those considering embarking upon philosophical study – 
whether formally or not – this last point may seem discouraging, reinforcing a picture 
of a discipline that even on the admission of its own practitioners has little impact on 
everyday life or concerns. I will explore these two philosophers’ views on personal 
identity in some detail, and outline the conflicts which they claim to exist between 
their philosophical and non-philosophical thinking. I will go on to propose that these 
conflicts do not in fact reinforce an opposition between everyday life and philosophy. 
 
David Hume’s brief discussion of personal identity has been highly influential.1 A 
key aspect of his account is captured by his following, famous remark: ‘For my part, 
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or 
pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe anything but the perception.’2 Having gone to look for a self in the sense in 
which it was commonly understood in his time – a single, enduring entity that stays 
the same throughout our lives – all Hume finds instead is a collection or ‘bundle’ of 
constantly and rapidly changing thoughts, sensations, and perceptions. He concludes 
that, as far as he can see, persons are nothing but bundles of changing mental 
properties, with no 
 
But Hume is very concerned with why we have the ideas that we do, and he cannot 
deny that we think we are enduring persons that survive and persist throughout the 
many changes that go on in our minds. This belief in personal identity arises, he 
speculates, from our observation that the various, distinct impressions in my mind 
succeed one another over time, and resemble one another, and appear to be causally 
linked – one thought giving rise to another. The result is still a bundle of diverse parts, 
but a bundle that is tied together by these relations of closeness in time (or as he calls 
it, ‘contiguity’), resemblance, and causation, so as to give rise to the illusion of the 
identity of ourselves over time. Although philosophical reflection about the matter 
forces us to admit that there’s still no single thing to be found that endures throughout 
the related impressions, Hume says that ‘we cannot long sustain our philosophy’. We 
will invariably yield to the non-philosophical belief that we are the same thing over 
time – a self, or soul, or substance, all of which are fictions of our imagination.3 
 
This non-philosophical conviction about the identity of the self is held by those who 
Hume sometimes, rather unflatteringly, calls ‘the vulgar’. It is important to understand 
that the vulgar are not a separate and perhaps lower class of people. Vulgarity is, 
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rather, a state of mind in which we all participate at some time or another, and no one 
is more ready to admit to vulgar tendencies than Hume himself. And his vulgar 
tendencies persist in spite of the fact that he clearly recognises that there is no room 
for his philosophical views within the vulgar frame of mind. This leads him grimly to 
contemplate the possibility that all our ‘reflections very refin’d and metaphysical have 
little or no influence upon us.’4 In some of the most personal passages to be found in 
the philosophical literature of his time, Hume goes on to confess that the apparent 
contradictions that he has unveiled between our vulgar fictions (which include our 
idea of our identity) and his metaphysical reflections (which reveal that the idea is ill-
founded) have plunged him into ‘the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d 
with the deepest darkness.’5 Happily, he notes, nature ‘cures me of this philosophical 
melancholy and delirium’ – he describes how he has dinner, gets together with 
friends, and plays a few games of backgammon, upon which his philosophical 
quandaries are forgotten, leaving him free to indulge his vulgar attitudes without any 
feeling of turmoil.6 
 
Derek Parfit, writing some 240 years after Hume, came to some similar conclusions 
about the self.7 Like Hume, Parfit denies that there is any evidence for a single, 
enduring self or person. A person is a collection of fleeting, disparate parts. Unlike 
Hume, Parfit does not restrict his attention to the mind but also includes the brain and 
the rest of the body amongst those parts. The result is still a bundle theory, since the 
brain and body are also made up of many different and changing parts. While the 
molecules of my brain and the rest of my body may not replace themselves at the rate 
at which my thoughts do, they nevertheless do, all of, them, change or disappear 
throughout my lifetime, given I live long enough. In contrast to Hume, Parfit opts for 
a somewhat more relaxed notion of identity by which, if all the changes in my mind 
and body continue on as normal, with no radical breaks or divisions (e.g. I don’t lapse 
into a coma, or develop severe amnesia, or have my still-functioning brain divided in 
half by surgeons and transplanted into the empty skulls of two waiting recipients – a 
favourite fantasy in personal identity theory), I can be said to remain the same person 
throughout my life. 
 
What is striking are not Parfit’s views about normal personal identity, but certain 
other conclusions he draws from the Humean starting point that persons come in 
bundles. These conclusions concern what matters to us with respect to our future 
existence. ‘What matters’, in this case, carries a rational and moral sense, meaning 
that it concerns how we should act towards ourselves and others as moral beings with 
certain desires that we wish fulfilled. For Parfit, how we should act should be dictated 
in large part by the metaphysical facts about personal identity – by what kind of 
things we are. If we recognise that there is for each of us no single thing (like a soul) 
that endures throughout our lives and which truly constitutes who we are, then we 
cannot, rationally speaking, be concerned for or worried about the preservation and 
flourishing of this thing, self, soul, or whatever we call it. 
 
The only reasonable candidates for what ought to matter to us are the ones already 
mentioned – the brain, the rest of the body, and the mind or psychological content 
(beliefs, wishes, hopes, aspirations, personality traits, and so forth). Amongst those 
candidates, Parfit holds that it is the psychological content that is generally the focus 
of our main concerns about our future; with the possible exception of, say, super-
models and athletes, most of us place more importance on our mind continuing on 
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unimpaired in the future than our body. In particular, we want our desires and 
ambitions fulfilled or at the very least to have the opportunity to fulfil them. And we 
want our thoughts, beliefs, memories, and personality to continue on – perhaps not in 
the same way, as we may wish for advancement or improvement, but without any 
radical breaks or lapses. In short, to use Parfit’s terms, we want the future to involve 
psychological continuity and connectedness to ourselves in the present. 
 
However, Parfit argues, all these things could continue, while we ourselves ceased to 
exist, or our continued existence became an indeterminate matter. Such a thing may 
never actually happen, but it is nevertheless a logical possibility. Consider a variation 
on the previously-mentioned brain division and transplant thought-experiment. 
Imagine you will divide overnight like an amoeba, into two new, physically-alike 
persons both of whom will ‘inherit’ all your psychology – your thoughts, memories, 
personality and so forth. I say two new persons because any other description seems 
implausible; we can’t say that you remain as one person with two bodies, since both 
embodied ‘halves’ of you would be spatially distinct and could go on to lead disparate 
lives. They may meet later and have a falling out and one kill the other in a fight – a 
situation which would seem to make it impossible to talk reasonably of there being 
one person. Perhaps, you could argue instead, there is only one new person, and you 
survive as one of the two products of the division, the other half being someone else 
(a copy perhaps?) But on what basis could it be said that one post-division person 
rather than the other is really you? They are by definition exactly alike in terms of the 
features they have at the moment of division. Maybe we could just pick one. Yes, 
certainly, but this would be an arbitrary decision made for the sake of convenience 
and not on the basis of any metaphysical fact – metaphysically speaking, as said, the 
two halves have all the same features. 
 
While we might intuitively be appalled at the prospect of our division, we shouldn’t 
be, according to Parfit. For although one cannot reasonably be said to survive such a 
division, what matters to most of us does. Our beliefs, hopes, memories, ambitions, 
and personality, all survive. In this case, they survive twice over. This is nothing like 
death, it seems, and may even be better than normal life – if you knew this were going 
to happen to you soon, you could plan to go to university straight away after school 
and also have a gap year. 
 
One’s response to all this may be, so what? Since we don’t divide like amoebas the 
above sort of speculations could not result in new metaphysical beliefs about our 
actual selves. But this is not so. The amoeba thought-experiment is an exercise to get 
us to recognise certain facts about ourselves. In normal life, identity goes together 
with psychological continuity and connectedness, and so we are not forced to choose 
between them, and can easily mistake our concern about one for concern about the 
other. But thought experiments like the amoeba one are meant to show that 
psychological continuity and connectedness can come apart from identity and exist 
without it, and so are different from it. Once we recognise this then even in normal 
cases involving unproblematic identity of ourselves over time, we will, Parfit hopes, 
realise that it is not this identity itself but the separable psychological continuity and 
connectedness that matters to us. 
 
These conclusions that Parfit arrives at concerning what matters to us in survival all 
result from his initial, Humean, metaphysical view that a person is nothing more than 
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a complex entity made up of fleeting and changing parts. If the view that he and 
Hume rejected were true – if a person were ultimately a single, enduring entity that 
continued to exist unvarying throughout all these changes – then Parfit could not draw 
the conclusions that he does. Because such an entity has no parts and so by definition 
is not divisible, Parfit would have to conclude that it would be destroyed upon 
division, or would go with one of the products of the division (we might not be able to 
tell which one, but there would still be a fact of the matter). But Parfit does not think 
there are such entities, and so he must accept what he believes are the consequences 
of the metaphysical view he does hold, and those consequences are that psychological 
continuity and connectedness matter and personal identity does not. 
 
These consequences are positive, as far as Parfit is concerned. The recognition that 
there is no single, unchanging self that endures throughout our lives, means that, even 
in cases of normal lives, what we call our identity over time is a matter of degree. 
Even if we don’t divide or undergo sudden radical physical or psychological change, 
we do change over time and therefore our present self may be more or less connected 
with our past or future self, depending upon the extent of changes between them. 
Realising this can help us to alleviate negative emotions and attitudes such as fear of 
death, egoism, and regret about the passing of our life, all of which gain their strength, 
according to Parfit, from the false belief that it is I, the exact same person, who is 
involved throughout. Parfit also sees positive ethical consequences of his view. 
 
My concern about my distant-future self, with whom my psychological connections 
are weak, will be more like my concern for other people to whom I am not currently 
connected. Therefore I have reason to act in a more altruistic, less self-interested way; 
my actions on behalf of my future self should not be radically different than my 
actions towards other people. While none of these consequences that Parfit discusses 
are without controversy, the point remains that he at least finds them extremely 
positive and even, in his word, ‘liberating’.8 
 
This is in sharp contrast to the feelings of darkness and despair into which we saw 
Hume driven by his own philosophical views. Even if Hume’s dining and gaming 
tendencies show that his life was not ruled by despair, an appendix he added to the 
Treatise makes matters look even more bleak. There he makes clear that the relations 
which bind together the bundle of thoughts and perceptions that constitute a self are 
not real; each of the perceptions are distinct existences that have the potential to exist 
apart from one another, and human understanding is incapable of discovering real 
connections between distinct existences. So the bundle falls apart. We have lost both 
the single, simple soul and the changing but unified bundle of perceptions and, it 
would seem, have thereby well and truly lost ‘our selves’ in any meaningful sense of 
the term. Surely this is cause for despair. How could anyone who believes it continue 
on the same as he or she did prior to such a realisation? And yet continue on Hume 
does. He leads a long and, if his own accounts are to be believed, quite happy life, 
filled with travel and friendship and the pleasures of the everyday. Perhaps the most 
obvious explanation for this, is that he simply cannot bear the truth that philosophy 
has revealed to him, and shuts it out of his mind in order to get on with his life. As we 
shall see, though, this is not his own explanation. 
 
If the negativity of Hume’s philosophical conclusions were the best explanation for 
his failure to sustain them, then the opposite should hold true for Parfit. Unlike Hume, 
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he discovered a positive outcome could emerge from the same metaphysical starting-
point.9 Inspired by his liberating views about personal identity, Parfit, we might 
expect, has no reason to attempt to distract himself from them through dining, 
backgammon or any other means. And yet, very much in keeping with Hume, Parfit 
also speaks of the considerable difficulty he has in sustaining his philosophical 
convictions. In passages reminiscent of Hume’s contrast between philosophy and 
vulgarity, Parfit talks of a split between the ‘reflective or intellectual level’ of thinking 
and some ‘lower level’.10 The reflective level concerns the metaphysical truth of the 
matter and the lower level what we are generally inclined to believe. Parfit confesses 
that when he forgets or fails to concentrate on his philosophical views he slips back 
into the sort of egoistic self-concern that is not rational according to his own 
arguments.11 But why is this so, if unlike Hume, he finds his conclusions to be 
positive? Why is even a reputedly beneficial truth hard to believe? 
 
To answer this, it may help to return to Hume, and note that it is not because his 
philosophical beliefs are depressing that he has trouble sustaining them. Rather he 
indicates that philosophical beliefs and thoughts – pleasant or unpleasant – are 
difficult to sustain, producing as they do only ‘mild and moderate sentiments’.12 Parfit 
at times seems to be of similar opinion; it is not that the truth is good or bad, but that 
it is hard to sustain any view that conflicts with the status-quo of everyday thinking 
(or lack thereof) about the matter; our everyday thinking is, as it were, our ‘default 
position’, and according to that mode of thinking, each of us is a single, enduring 
person whose identity is fixed and stable, and not a fiction or a matter of degree 
(witness your own, likely less-than-cheerful response to the prospect of your 
division). Hume and Parfit’s agreement on this matter is reinforced when we look at 
the explanations that they both give for our everyday thinking. Hume says it arises 
from our ‘nature’ or instinct; like many other things we perhaps ought not, 
philosophically speaking, to believe, we cannot help but doing so. We are part of 
nature and as such are subject to its dictates. Parfit, like Hume, believes that our 
tendency to cling to this notion has something to do with the kind of beings we are. 
He holds that we human beings are, for better or for worse, in possession of the 
concept of a single, enduring and unchanging self; it is built into the structure of our 
thought and so this concept continues to work its influence upon us even once we 
know better. 13 
 
To sum up, we have in Hume and Parfit examples of two philosophers who, while 
passionate and articulate about their philosophical beliefs, nevertheless and upon their 
own admission cannot easily sustain those beliefs. We also have some indication as to 
why this is so, namely that it is built into our nature or our conceptual scheme that it 
could not be otherwise. Does all of this serve to reinforce the sort of view mentioned 
at the outset, namely that certain philosophical ideas – be they negative or positive – 
have little to no effect on our everyday lives, but occur, if at all, in a vacuum? 
 
Before we proclaim a complete victory for vulgarity over philosophy, we should be 
very careful about how we depict their opposition. Hume himself is very careful in 
this regard, in that although he treats vulgar impulses as ‘natural’ he does not view 
philosophy as somehow unnatural. Indeed he remarks that we (many of us at least) are 
also naturally inclined to philosophise (‘’tis almost impossible for the mind of man to 
rest, like those of beasts, in that narrow circle of objects, which are the subject of 
daily conversation and action’14), and so long as we are compelled to do so we ought 
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to do so, and in doing so the thoughts that ensue, though no doubt requiring more 
mental effort than backgammon, will not be unnaturally forced. The worst thing one 
can do, as far as Hume is concerned on this matter, is to have an inclination to 
philosophise but suppress or reject it. Hume is not simply driven away from 
philosophy and into the real world – he is catapulted back and forth between them in a 
relentless though often exhilarating fashion, and by the same natural forces.15 If we 
treat philosophical speculation as not the enemy of natural inclination but an 
extension of it, we can view this swinging back and forth as two interdependent rather 
than opposed activities. They are interdependent because the loss of one is a loss for 
the other: clearly, unrelieved philosophical contemplation is not possible and would 
be detrimental to one’s overall well-being as far as Hume is concerned; but likewise 
the complete denial of philosophical impulses is also damaging. As Hume proclaims, 
regarding his philosophical impulses, ‘these sentiments spring up naturally in my 
present disposition; and shou’d I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself to 
any other business or diversion, I feel I shou’d be a loser in point of pleasure; and this 
is the origin of my philosophy’.16 
 
Similarly for Parfit, the conflict between aspects of his philosophical and his non-
philosophical thinking does not constitute a complete separation of them. While Parfit 
acknowledges the difficulty of sustaining his carefully considered views on personal 
identity, it in the end amounts to no more than that: a difficulty, but one which he 
strives to overcome in the interest of the truth. ‘The truth is very different from what 
we are inclined to believe’, he is fond of stating.17 It is therefore harder won. It is 
perhaps not surprising then that we often opt for the easiest way of getting by, 
neglecting or setting aside beliefs which are apparently true. But the fact that such 
beliefs are harder won and as a consequence perhaps more rare is not reason to view 
them as not properly belonging to and impacting on our lives as a whole. Parfit makes 
clear that despite his lapses, his views on personal identity have had a profound affect 
on his life: prior to establishing those views, he writes, ‘I seemed imprisoned in 
myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every 
year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls 
of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.18 
 
I started out with a contrast between philosophy and everyday life. But I think we 
should now see this as a false opposition. It is without doubt that any view which 
suggests that our identity is a fiction, or is something that does not matter, is 
extremely daunting. It is possible that even if we concentrated all our effort upon 
sustaining such a view we would on occasion fail.19 This failure may, as speculated, 
have less to do with the nature of the view in question than with our human nature or 
the way our minds are constructed. Whatever the reason, the fact that both Hume and 
Parfit find it difficult and sometimes impossible to sustain their philosophical 
convictions or act purely in accordance with them does not detract from the fact that 
these convictions are a fundamental part of their whole lives, which would be poorer 
without them. 
 
Kathy Behrendt 
New College 
University of Oxford 
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13 This is a point which he develops in ‘The Unimportance of Identity’, in H. Harris (ed.) Identity 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 13-45. 
14 Hume, p. 176. 
15 Again, see his Conclusion of Book I of the Treatise for a detailed account. 
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19 Though Parfit suggests that Buddhism may be the nearest thing to a full-time implementation of his 
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